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Case Note 
Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 
2009)* 
Gary E. Davidson** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Osorio v. Dole Food Co., plaintiffs sought to enforce a $97 million 
Nicaraguan civil judgment against defendants Dole Food Co. (“Dole”) and 
Dow Chemical Co. (“Dow”) under the Florida Uniform Out-of-Country 
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (the “Florida Recognition 
Act”).1  Plaintiffs comprised a group of 150 Nicaraguan citizens alleged to 
have worked on banana plantations in Nicaragua between 1970 and 1982, 
during which time they were allegedly exposed to the chemical compound 
dibromochloropropane (“DBCP”).  DBCP is an agricultural pesticide that 
was banned in the United States in 1977, and in Nicaragua in 1993, after its 
usage was linked to sterility in factory workers.2 
A trial court in Chinandega, Nicaragua, rendered the judgment at issue 
in this case.  It awarded Plaintiffs $97 million—an average award of 
$647,000 per plaintiff—under “Special Law 364,” a statute enacted by the 
Nicaraguan legislature in 2000.  According to the Nicaraguan trial court, the 
purpose of the high award was to compensate plaintiffs for their DBCP-
induced infertility and accompanying adverse psychological effects.  De-
fendants appealed the judgment to an intermediate appellate court in Nica-
ragua.  That appeal has remained pending for over four and one-half years, 
with no indication when a decision will be forthcoming. 
                                                                                                                           
 * This article was originally presented at the Florida Bar International Law Section 8th Annual 
International Law and Arbitration Conference on February 12, 2010, in Miami, Florida. 
 ** Gary Davidson is a partner in Diaz Reus & Targ, LLP’s, Miami office.  He concentrates his 
practice in international litigation and arbitration, and has served as both a mediator and an arbitrator.  In 
addition, Mr. Davidson is a frequent lecturer on managing and resolving international commercial dis-
putes.  He earned his law degree from the University of Southern California, and an LL.M., with distinc-
tion, in international and comparative law from the Georgetown University Law Center.  Mr. Davidson 
would like to thank Xiang Jian, a third-year law student at the University of North Carolina, for his 
assistance in researching and writing this article. 
1
  See FLA. STAT. §§ 55.601-607 (2009). 
 
2
 See Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2009).   
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Dole and Dow raised several objections to domesticating the Nicara-
guan judgment in the Southern District of Florida.  They contended that 
under the Florida Recognition Act, the court should not enforce the Nicara-
guan judgment because: 
(1) the Nicaraguan trial court lacked personal and/or subject matter 
jurisdiction under Special Law 364; 
(2) the judgment was rendered under a system which did not provide 
procedures compatible with the due process of law; 
(3) enforcing the judgment would violate Florida public policy; and 
(4) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that lacked 
impartial tribunals.3 
The district court held that Dole and Dow had “clearly established their 
entitlement to non-recognition on each of these independent grounds.”4 
II.  SPECIAL LAW 364 
At the heart of the dispute was Special Law 364, enacted by the Nica-
raguan legislature specifically to address DBCP claims.  “Special Law 364 
is unique in that its provisions apply only to DBCP litigation, and only 
against specific defendants such as Dole and Dow.”5  Notably, the Law pro-
vided that a plaintiff could establish a defendant’s liability through an “irre-
futable presumption.”  This irrefutable presumption is achieved by a plain-
tiff demonstrating that (1) they were exposed to DBCP, and (2) that the 
plaintiff presently suffers from sterility.6  A plaintiff can established proof of 
sterility by providing two certified medical examinations from a nationally 
accredited institution. 
In addition to establishing an irrefutable presumption as to liability, 
Special Law 364 also provided a minimum damage award of $125,000 to a 
prevailing plaintiff.  However, the trial court retained the discretion to 
award significantly higher damages based on comparable damage awards 
rendered in foreign countries, such as the United States. 
As for litigation costs, the Law presumed that a plaintiff was indigent.  
Consequently, the Nicaraguan government was responsible for covering a 
plaintiff’s litigation expenses.  In contrast, Special Law 364 imposed signif-
icant financial burdens on prospective defendants.  “For example, defen-
dants are required to post a $100,000 bond ‘as a procedural prerequisite for 
                                                                                                                           
 
3
 Id. 
 
4
 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
5
 Id. at 1314. 
 
6
 Id. 
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being able to take part in the lawsuit.’”7  The purpose of the bond, accord-
ing to the Law, was to cover court costs and to provide compensation for 
would-be plaintiffs.  Moreover, Article 8 of Special Law 364 required a 
defendant to post a $15 million bond (approximately) within ninety days of 
receiving notice of a complaint in order to create a fund which would guar-
antee payment to plaintiffs.8  
Article 12 of Special Law 364 also established a mandatory “3-8-3” 
summary proceeding whereby “defendants have three days to answer the 
complaint, the parties have eight days to present their evidence, and the 
court has three days to issue a verdict.”9  What is more, the Law eliminates 
any applicable statutes of limitations to a plaintiff’s claims and provides 
that any resulting judgment is immediately executable despite the pendency 
of an appeal.  Special Law 364 also eliminates review by the Nicaraguan 
Supreme Court, designating the intermediate appellate courts as the only 
courts capable of handling DBCP litigation appeals.  Lastly, pursuant to 
Article 7 of Special Law 364, a defendant has the right to select its venue 
and opt out of the Law by submitting themselves to jurisdiction in the Unit-
ed States.10 
III. THE FLORIDA RECOGNITION ACT 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not re-
quire states to recognize judgments rendered by foreign courts.11  Absent a 
formal treaty, the effect given to a foreign judgment has historically been 
governed  
by the more flexible doctrine of comity, which, though often couched 
in the language of mutual respect and obligation, is most accurately 
described as a matter of grace. . . . A state’s decision to recognize a 
foreign judgment will inevitably depend on a variety of circumstances 
which cannot be reduced to any certain rule . . . .12 
                                                                                                                           
 
7
 Id. at 1315. 
 
8
 Id. 
 
9
 Id. (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, No. CV 03-8846, 2005 WL 6184247, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 
Nov. 10, 2005)). 
 
10
 Id.  Article 7 also requires a defendant to expressly waive the defense of forum non conveniens 
upon submitting itself to the jurisdiction of a U.S. court. 
 
11
 Id. at 1322; see also Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 883 (4th Cir. 1992).  See generally 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 
12
 Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1322 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166 (1895) (“No sove-
reign is bound, unless by special compact, to execute within his dominions a judgment rendered by the 
tribunals of another State.”) (internal quotations omitted); U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 8 
(1st Cir. 1997)). 
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In 1994, Florida adopted a variant of the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act,13 codified at Florida Statutes section 55.601-
607.  Florida’s Supreme Court has noted that the Florida Recognition Act 
was adopted to “ensure the recognition abroad of judgments rendered in 
Florida.”14  Accordingly, the Florida Recognition Act attempts to “guarantee 
the recognition of Florida judgments rendered abroad.”15   
The Florida Recognition Act makes a foreign judgment prima facie 
enforceable if it “is final, conclusive, and enforceable where rendered, even 
though an appeal therefrom is pending or is subject to appeal.”16  Once the 
party seeking to enforce the judgment follows the filing and notice re-
quirements set forth under section 55.603, the judgment will be enforced 
unless the judgment debtor objects within thirty days.  However, the Florida 
Recognition Act specifically provides three mandatory and eight discretio-
nary circumstances where a foreign judgment is not entitled to recognition 
in Florida courts. 
Specifically, section 55.605 provides: 
(1) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if [non-recognition re-
quired]: 
(a)  The judgment was rendered under a system which does not 
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the 
requirements of due process of law. 
(b)  The foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant. 
(c)  The foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject 
matter. 
(2) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if [non-recognition 
permitted]: 
(a)  The defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not 
receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable 
him or her to defend. 
(b) The judgment was obtained by fraud. 
                                                                                                                           
 
13
 See FLA. STAT § 55.601 (2009); see also Nadd v. LeCredit Lyonnais, S.A., 804 So. 2d 1226, 
1228 (Fla. 2001) (the Florida Recognition Act “replaced common law principles of comity relating to 
the recognition of foreign judgments”). 
 
14
 See Nadd, 804 So. 2d at 1228. 
 
15
 Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1323. 
 
16
 FLA. STAT. § 55.603. 
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(c)  The cause of action or claim for relief on which the judgment 
is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state. 
(d)  The judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive or-
der. 
(e)  The proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an 
agreement between the parties under which the dispute in 
question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in 
that court. 
(f)  In the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the 
foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial 
of the action. 
(g)  The foreign jurisdiction where judgment was rendered would 
not give recognition to a similar judgment rendered in this 
state. 
(h)  The cause of action resulted in a defamation judgment ob-
tained in a jurisdiction outside the United States, unless the 
court sitting in this state before which the matter is brought 
first determines that the defamation law applied in the for-
eign court’s adjudication provided at least as much protection 
for freedom of speech and press in that case as would be 
provided by the United States Constitution and the State 
Constitution. 17 
Here, the defendants contended that each mandatory ground, as well as the 
discretionary public policy ground, barred enforcement of the judgment.18  
The district court agreed. 
The court found that the plaintiffs had met their initial burden to prove 
that the Nicaraguan judgment was “final, conclusive, and enforceable 
where rendered” and that plaintiffs had “satisfied this burden based on their 
showing that the judgment would be enforceable in Nicaragua under Article 
14 of Special Law 364.”19  The burden then shifted to the defendants, ex-
plained the court, to establish one or more grounds for non-recognition.20  
The district court refused to enforce the Nicaraguan judgment, finding that 
                                                                                                                           
 
17
 FLA. STAT. § 55.605 (2010). 
 
18
 Dole and Dow also asserted that the fraud-based exception to enforcement applied. The district 
court expressly declined to examine the merits of this contention, limiting its consideration only to the 
remaining defenses to recognition raised by Dole and Dow.  See Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1323. 
 
19
 Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1324. 
 
20
 Id. (citing Kramer v. Von Mitschke-Collande, 5 So. 3d 689, 690 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008)). 
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the “defendants ha[d] met their burden on multiple, independent grounds 
for non-recognition.”21 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A.  The Nicaraguan Trial Court Lacked Personal and Subject Matter Juris-
diction [Florida Statutes section 55.605(1)(b)-(c)]      
Under section 55.605(1)(b)-(c), the rendering court must possess both 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  Dole and Dow 
argued that because they “opted out of Nicaragua’s jurisdiction under Sec-
tion 7 of Special Law 364, the Nicaraguan trial court lacked jurisdiction 
over them.”22  Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that “Section 7 d[id] not 
allow defendants to opt out of Nicaragua’s jurisdiction, but merely pro-
vide[d] plaintiffs with a choice of venue.”23  The district court held that the 
Nicaraguan trial court possessed neither personal nor subject matter juris-
diction under Section 7 of Special Law 364.24 
In reaching its conclusion, the court determined that defendants, in 
electing not to make the deposits as required by Special Law 364, invoked 
their opt-out rights under Nicaraguan law25 and thereby divested the Nica-
raguan trial court of subject matter and personal jurisdiction.26  The district 
court found that Special Law 364 was a “blocking statute” that was in-
tended specifically to prevent courts in the United States from finding that 
an alternative forum is “available” to hear a plaintiff’s lawsuit.27  The court 
further observed that Special Law 364: 
appear[ed] to be somewhat unique among blocking statutes in that it 
operate[d] by establishing onerous conditions under which defendants 
would litigate and then providing defendants with the right to opt out 
                                                                                                                           
 
21
 Id. 
 
22
 Id. 
 
23
 Id. 
 
24
 See id. 
 
25
 See id. at 1326.  The court noted that Special Law 364 “accomplishes this by effectively elimi-
nating forum non conveniens defenses in the United States in DBCP litigation because it makes the 
foreign forum so unattractive from a defendant’s perspective.  One commentator has opined that the law 
is an attempt to restore the plaintiffs’ traditional rights under Latin American law, where the plaintiff 
always has the ‘unfettered right to choose [to litigate] in the defendant’s court.’”  Id. at 1324 (quoting in 
part Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking Statutes, 35 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 21, 26 (2003)). 
 
26
 Id. 
 
27
 See id. at 1325 (citing Scotts Co. v. Hacienda Loma Linda, 2 So. 3d 1013, 1015 n.2 (Fla. 3d 
Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation: The Impact 
on the Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of Forum Non Conveniens as a 
Defense Tactic, 56 KAN. L. REV. 609, 622 (2008)). 
2009] Osorio v. Dole Food Co. 199 
 
of Nicaragua’s jurisdiction . . . . [Thus, i]t [wa]s beyond dispute that 
Special Law 364 provide[d] ample incentives for the defendants to ex-
ercise their opt-out rights by . . . effectively depriving them of due 
process in their effort to mount a defense.28 
In other words, explained the court, either the defendants “have a right 
to opt out of Nicaragua’s jurisdiction, which requires that the court deny 
recognition under Florida Statutes section 55.605(1)(b)-(c), or they are sub-
ject to a legal regime that does not provide due process, which requires de-
nying recognition under Florida Statutes section 55.605(1)(a).”29  The court 
noted that plaintiffs confront a classic “Catch-22”, in that either circums-
tance constitutes mandatory non-recognition under the Florida Recognition 
Act.30 
The district court rejected plaintiffs’ claim that Article 7 did not give 
Dow and Dole a right to opt out of Nicaragua’s jurisdiction by refusing to 
make the deposits, but instead simply “preclude[d Defendants] from ar-
guing forum non conveniens if the plaintiffs decided to sue in the United 
States.”31  Nicaraguan law, the court determined, plainly could “not pre-
scribe the legal effect that the defendants’ actions in Nicaragua w[ould] 
have in United States courts.  Nicaraguan law can only determine what ef-
fect such actions w[ould] have in Nicaragua’s own courts.”32  The court was 
also persuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Dow Chemical v. Calde-
ron, which found in dictum that Article 7 “is most reasonably read to pro-
vide DBCP defendants with a right to elect jurisdiction.”33 
The district court concluded that Special Law 364 provide[d] that De-
fendants’ refusal to make the deposits and waiver of forum non conveniens 
defenses ha[d] the legal effect, in Nicaragua, of removing the case from the 
jurisdiction of Nicaragua’s trial courts.  Special Law 364 d[id] not dictate 
what legal effect the Defendants’ actions w[ould] have in subsequent pro-
ceedings in the United States, nor d[id] it purport to do so.34  Here, “Defen-
dants expressly opted out of Special Law 364 by refusing to make the re-
quired deposits and by waiving their forum non conveniens arguments in 
United States courts.  These actions had the legal effect of depriving the 
Nicaraguan courts of jurisdiction.”35  Consequently, Florida Statutes section 
                                                                                                                           
 
28
 Id. 
 
29
 Id. 
 
30
 Id. 
 
31
 Id.  
 
32
 Id. 
 
33
 Id. at 1326 (citing Dow Chem. v. Calderon, 422 F.3d 827, 832-33 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 
34
 Id. 
 
35
 Id. 
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55.605(1)(b)-(c) compelled mandatory non-recognition of the Nicaraguan 
trial court’s $97 million award. 
B.  Special Law 364 is Incompatible With the International Concept of Due 
Process [Florida Statutes section 55.605(1)(a)]      
In addition to finding that the Nicaraguan trial court lacked both per-
sonal and subject matter jurisdiction to render its judgment, the district 
court also held that “Defendants ha[d] met their burden of proving that the 
legal regime set up by Special Law 364 and applied in this case d[id] not 
comport with the ‘basic fairness’ that the ‘international concept of due 
process’ require[d].”36  This violation of international due process, the court 
determined, compelled its non-recognition of the Nicaraguan trial court’s 
judgment under Florida Statutes section 55.605(1)(a), for “[this] court 
c[ould] not enforce the judgment because it was rendered under a legal sys-
tem that did not provide ‘procedures compatible with the requirements of 
due process of law.’”37 
1.  The Concept of International Due Process 
Florida cannot recognize a foreign judgment if it was “rendered under 
a system which does not provide . . . procedures compatible with the re-
quirements of due process of law.”38  The Osorio court noted that the term 
“due process” in this context “d[id] not refer to the ‘latest twist and turn of 
our courts’ regarding procedural due process norms, because it [was] not 
‘intended to reflect the idiosyncratic jurisprudence of a particular state.’”39  
Rather, it was “meant to embody an ‘international concept of due process,’ 
defined as ‘a concept of fair procedures simple and basic enough to de-
scribe the judicial processes of civilized nations, our peers.’”40 
Dole and Dow argued that the procedures under which the Nicaraguan 
case was tried were incompatible with the requirements of international due 
process because numerous provisions of Special Law 364 failed to provide 
“basic fairness” to DBCP defendants subject to its provisions.  The court 
first evaluated the defendants’ claim by examining the scientific basis for 
the irrefutable presumption of causation afforded to plaintiffs who estab-
lished DBCP exposure and sperm damage.  That evaluation was required to 
determine whether the presumption constituted a procedure consistent with 
                                                                                                                           
 
36
 Id. at 1345 (citing Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
 
37
 Id. at 1326-27 (quoting in part FLA. STAT. § 55.605(1)(a) (2009)). 
 
38
 FLA. STAT. § 55.605(1)(a). 
 
39
 Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1327 (quoting in part Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 476-77). 
 
40
 Id. at 1327 (quoting Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 476-77). 
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due process in light of the medical testimony in the case.41  The court then 
analyzed the remaining provisions of Special Law 364 under the rubric of 
disparate or discriminatory treatment of foreign defendants.42 
2.  Special Law 364’s Irrefutable Presumption of Causation 
The district court determined that Article 9 of Special Law 364 im-
posed an “irrefutable presumption of causation” between plaintiffs’ alleged 
sterility and their asserted exposure to DBCP in such a way that violated the 
international concept of due process.43  “Statutes creating permanent irrefut-
able presumptions have long been disfavored,” especially when they deny 
the opposing side a fair opportunity to rebut the causal chain.44  Here, this 
principle was especially salient because the facts presumed were not neces-
sarily or universally true, particularly in the face of unrefuted medical and 
scientific evidence indicating that it was factually impossible for what was 
represented in the Nicaraguan court’s judgment to have occurred.45  Without 
proof of causation, the link between plaintiffs’ injury and defendants’ con-
duct was “purely speculative, and any damages awarded necessarily oc-
cur[ed] without due consideration for the defendants’ fault.”46 
As a result, the Osorio court was “confident” that international due 
process norms as described in Ashenden did “not permit awarding damages, 
especially of the magnitude awarded here [approximately $97 million, or 
$647,000 per plaintiff], without proof of causation.”47  The court held that 
“those norms certainly d[id] not permit awarding damages in the face of 
clear scientific proof of the absence of causation.  To do so would require 
defendants to pay huge sums without proof of fault, indeed, in this case, 
with proof that they [were] not at fault.”48  The court determined that Spe-
cial Law 364 “constitute[d] an attempt, by legislative fiat, to enact into exis-
tence a fact which here d[id] not, and [could] not be made to, exist in actu-
ality.”49  Therefore, the district court “d[id] not hesitate to conclude that 
awarding damages without regard for fault [wa]s the antithesis of basic 
fairness both in domestic and international litigation.  The Florida Recogni-
tion Act contain[ed] enumerated, mandatory grounds for non-recognition of 
                                                                                                                           
 
41
 Id. 
 
42
 Id. 
 
43
 Id. at 1328. 
 
44
 Id. at 1332 (quoting Valndis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 445 (1973)). 
 
45
 See id. at 1335. 
 
46
 Id. at 1332 (citing Noblesville Casting Div. of TRW, Inc. v. Prince, 438 N.E.2d 722, 731 (Ind. 
1982)). 
 
47
 Id. at 1335. 
 
48
 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
49
 Id. (quoting Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 329 (1932)). 
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foreign judgments precisely to prevent courts in this state from becoming a 
party to such legal caprice.”50   
3.  Special Law 364’s Disparate Treatment of Specific Foreign Com-
pany Defendants 
The court determined that Article 3 of Special Law 364 was not de-
signed to be a law of general applicability, but was instead intended “to 
target a narrowly defined group of foreign defendants and subject them to 
discriminatory provisions that d[id] not apply to domestic defendants.”51  
Special Law 364’s limited applicability to a narrowly defined group of for-
eign companies, combined with its unique discriminatory provisions, “to-
gether amount[ed] to a denial of due process” sufficient to compel the 
court’s non-enforcement of the Nicaraguan trial court’s judgment under 
section 55.605 of the Florida Statutes. 
One of the provisions that Dole and Dow asserted as proof that Special 
Law 364 targeted them for disparate treatment was the Law’s unique mini-
mum damages requirement - - entitling a successful plaintiff to a minimum 
damage award of $125,000.52  The court concluded that “[b]oth the mini-
mum awards mandated by Special Law 364, and the actual awards in DBCP 
cases, [were] so disproportionate to the damages commonly awarded in 
Nicaraguan litigation - - which include damages awarded for injuries signif-
icantly more severe than the ones complained of in this case - - that it [wa]s 
clear that the damages provided for in Special Law 364 constitute[d] ex-
traordinary damage provisions unique in Nicaragua's legal system.”53 
The district court also found that Special Law 364 “unfairly discrimi-
nate[d] against [defendants] by requiring them, as a condition to defending 
DBCP claims, to deposit $100,000 within 90 days after the complaint [wa]s 
filed and $15 million within 90 days of receiving notice of the complaint.”54  
It determined that “[n]o other litigants in Nicaragua [were] required to pro-
vide deposits which [were] anywhere near the deposit requirements that 
Special Law 364 impose[d] on DBCP defendants” and that the statute 
placed defendants in an “untenable jurisdictional conundrum.”55  Moreover, 
the court determined that by providing for an appeal only to the interme-
diate appellate courts, and not to Nicaragua’s Supreme Court, and by limit-
ing intermediate appeals only to instances without a stay of execution, Spe-
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 Id. at 1336. 
 
52
 Id.  
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 Id. at 1338. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. at 1339. 
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cial Law 364 unfairly targeted U.S. companies in violation of the interna-
tional concept of due process.56  In contrast, the Nicaraguan Constitution 
explicitly provided a right to appeal verdicts of such a magnitude to the 
country’s Supreme Court, and a stay of execution is generally available in 
Nicaraguan tort actions.57 
Additionally, the court determined that Special Law 364 discriminated 
against Dole and Dow by requiring a 3-8-3 summary proceeding58 for med-
ically complex cases involving male sterility.  Although such summary pro-
ceedings were common in Latin America, the court found no examples of 
their application in a case as complex as DBCP liability.  “It appear[ed],” 
the court concluded, “that the clear intent of requiring a 3-8-3 summary 
proceeding was to unfairly fast track these substantial and complex cases, 
and thereby deny[ing] DBCP defendants sufficient time to present an ade-
quate defense.”59  
Furthermore, the court found that Special Law 364 violated interna-
tional due process by abolishing applicable statutes of limitations, despite 
plaintiffs’ argument that their claims would have been timely regardless of 
the repeal of the statute of limitations period.  The district court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument for two principal reasons.  First, “Plaintiffs ha[d] not 
shown, nor d[id] the record indicate, that the Nicaraguan trial court found 
that Plaintiffs did not have timely notice of their purported injuries such that 
the usually applicable limitations period would not have run.”60  Second, 
“given that Dole left Nicaragua approximately 30 years ago, and the unre-
futed medical testimony that DBCP's effects on sperm quality are proximate 
to exposure, plaintiffs rendered sterile by DBCP would have known about it 
decades ago.”61  Plaintiffs’ claims, the court concluded, would be time-
barred absent Special Law 364's removal of statutes of limitation and impo-
sition of retrospective liability.62 
Equality before the law, concluded the court, “[wa]s basic to any defi-
nition of due process and fair play.”63  Although “[t]his d[id] not mean that 
foreign parties [could] not be subjected to certain procedural regulations, 
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 See id. at 1339-40. 
 
57
 Id. 
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 Id. at 1340 (noting that “[t]he 3-8-3 procedure provides only eight days for the submission of 
evidence, even though the standard procedure in Nicaragua permits 20 days”).  
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 Id.  
 
60
 Id. at 1341. 
 
61
 Id. 
 
62
 See id. 
 
63
 Id. (“We pride ourselves in a system of justice that requires equality before the law.  Defen-
dants should not be treated differently upon the same or similar facts. When the facts are the same, the 
law should be the same.” (quoting Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539, 541 (Fla. 1975)). 
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such as reasonable security requirements, to ensure their compliance with 
court orders,”64 it “d[id] mean that foreign litigants c[ould] not be subjected 
to a legal regime unfairly different from that applied to domestic litigants 
simply because they [were] foreigners.”65  In sum, the district court found 
that Special Law 364 contained “numerous unique provisions that applied 
only to a narrow class of foreign defendants, and operated to their distinct 
disadvantage in a pronounced discriminatory fashion.”66  The court con-
cluded that defendants’ disparate treatment under Special Law 364 was 
“fatally unfair and discriminatory, fail[ed] to provide the minimum level of 
due process to which all foreign defendants [were] entitled, and [wa]s, 
therefore incompatible with the requirements of due process of law under 
the Florida Recognition Act.”67 
C.  The Nicaraguan Judgment Should Not be Enforced on Public Policy 
Grounds [Florida Statutes section 55.605(2)(c)]      
A foreign judgment should not be enforced on public policy grounds 
when “enforcement would clearly undermine public confidence in the ad-
ministration of the law or in the security of individual rights.”68  The exis-
tence of “[a] mere difference between Florida law and foreign law is insuf-
ficient to merit non-recognition [of a foreign judgment] on public policy 
grounds because the Florida Recognition Act sets a high bar for defendants 
before they can avail themselves of the basis for non-recognition.”69  In 
addition to determining that the law applied by the Nicaraguan trial court 
contradicted Florida law, the Osorio court found that the level of contraven-
tion was “sufficient to warrant non-recognition on public policy grounds”70 
pursuant to the discretionary language of Florida Statutes section 
55.605(2)(c).71 
The court held that “the irrefutable presumption of causation [under 
Special Law 364] relied upon in the [Nicaraguan] Judgment [wa]s repug-
                                                                                                                           
 
64
 Id. (citing Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 111 (1921)) (finding that a statute permitting the 
attachment of property belonging to a foreign defendant did not violate due process). 
 
65
 Id. at 1342 (holding that a “corporation of one state” litigating in the courts of another “cannot 
be subjected, merely because it is a corporation, to onerous requirements . . . not laid on other suitors in 
like situations” (citing Ky. Fin. Corp. v. Paramont Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544, 551 (1923))). 
 
66
 Id. (citing Defendants’ expert Stephen Schwebel, a judge on the International Court in The 
Hague for twenty years, who testified that the unfair, discriminatory nature of Special Law 364 ex-
ceeded that of any law which he had encountered). 
 
67
 Id. 
 
68
 Id. at 1345 (citing Somportex, Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 
1971)). 
 
69
 Id. at 1345-46. 
 
70
 Id. at 1346. 
 
71
 FLA. STAT. § 55.605(2)(c) (2009).  
2009] Osorio v. Dole Food Co. 205 
 
nant to Florida public policy because it deprived [Defendants] of their basic 
right to defend themselves.”72  According to the district court, “[f]or a pre-
sumption to comport with due process under Florida law (1) there must be a 
rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed 
and (2) there must be a right to rebut [the presumption] in a fair manner.”73  
Applying this standard to the instant case, the Osorio court concluded that  
[T]he presumption of causation in Special Law 364 contradict[ed] 
known scientific fact and afford[ed] no opportunity for rebuttal.  It 
create[d] liability by legislative fiat and mandate[d] large damage 
awards without determining whether the defendants actually injured 
the plaintiffs.  Special Law 364's presumption of causation [was] 
therefore . . . unconstitutional [under] Florida [law].74 
D.  Nicaragua Lacked Sufficiently Impartial Tribunals [Florida Statutes 
section 55.605(1)(a)]  
Lastly, the district court concluded that the Nicaraguan judgment was 
not entitled to enforcement as Nicaragua lacked impartial tribunals.75  The 
Florida Recognition Act “includes the absence of impartial tribunals [in the 
nation where the Judgment was rendered] as a mandatory basis for non-
recognition.”76  After reviewing pertinent evidence and assessing the credi-
bility of live testimony, the Osorio court concluded that the “evidence [wa]s 
compelling that Nicaragua lack[ed] impartial tribunals.”77  This conclusion, 
the court asserted, was “based on the credible evidence that, while on paper 
and in theory Nicaragua ha[d] all the trappings of an independent judiciary, 
in practice the judiciary d[id] not act impartially.”78 
Among other evidence cited, the U.S. State Department’s country re-
port from 2002 (the year that Osorio was filed in Nicaragua) concluded that 
“[Nicaraguan] [j]udges’ political sympathies, acceptance of bribes, or influ-
ence from political leaders reportedly often influenced judicial actions and 
findings. . . . Both lower courts and the Supreme Court rendered controver-
                                                                                                                           
 
72
 Id. 
 
73
 Id. (quoting in part Straughn v. K&K Land Mgmt., Inc., 326 So. 2d 421, 424 (Fla. 1976)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
74
 Id.; see also Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., 678 So. 2d 1239, 
1254 (Fla. 1996) (holding that an analogously irrefutable statutory presumption created an unfair 
process contrary to state public policy). 
 
75
 Id. at 1347 (contending that the district court “admit[s] that it [wa]s not entirely comfortable 
sitting in judgment of another nation’s judicial system, but d[id] so in deference to the Florida Recogni-
tion Act”). 
 
76
 Id. at 1347; see FLA. STAT.§ 55.605(1)(a) (2009). 
 
77
 Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1347. 
 
78
 Id. at 1347-48. 
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sial judgments dismissing evidence and convictions against international 
drug traffickers.”79  In 2008, the State Department’s assessment of Nicara-
gua’s judiciary “continued to deteriorate.”80  “Numerous” other reports also 
concluded that Nicaragua lacked impartial tribunals, leading the court to 
conclude that it was “the unanimous view among United States government 
organizations and officials (including United States ambassadors to Nicara-
gua), foreign governments, international organizations, and credible Nica-
raguan authorities, that the judicial branch in Nicaragua [wa]s dominated by 
political forces and, in general, d[id] not dispense impartial justice.”81  Fi-
nally, the court found that two well-qualified defense experts had credibly 
testified that “the problems in Nicaragua’s judiciary exceed[ed] those of any 
other Latin American country,” and that “in its formal structure, the Nicara-
guan judiciary appear[ed] to have all the hallmarks one would expect of a 
classical liberal, democratic state, but in practice its decisions [were] com-
monly driven by partisan interests—not the rule of law.”82 
Facing a similar situation, the Second Circuit in Bridgeway Corp. v. 
Citibank affirmed the district court’s finding that Liberia lacked a system of 
impartial tribunals.83  Based on Bridgeway Corp., and “in view of the per-
suasive evidence that direct political interference and judicial corruption in 
Nicaragua [wa]s widespread,” the Court held that “the judgment in this case 
                                                                                                                           
 
79
 Id. at 1348 (finding in 2005, the same “Report had omitted the word ‘reportedly,’ which the 
2002 Report contained, in its findings regarding political influence and corruption in the judiciary, 
indicating that in the State Department’s opinion the state of judicial independence in Nicaragua wor-
sened in the years immediately preceding this action”). 
 
80
 Id. (quoting 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: NICARAGUA, 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRACTICES (2010) (“Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, the judicial system 
remained susceptible to corruption and politicization, and did not function independently.  The Judicial 
Career Law requires that new judicial appointments be vetted by the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ); 
however, judicial appointments were often based on nepotism, influence, or political affiliation. Once 
appointed, many judges were subject to political and economic pressures that affected their judicial 
independence.”)). 
 
81
 Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1349 (citing COUNTRY REPORT: NICARAGUA, FREEDOM HOUSE 
NICARAGUA 5 (2009), available at http://freedomhouse.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2010) (concluding 
that domination of the judiciary by the FSLN and PLC continues); NICARAGUA: INTEGRITY 
SCORECARD, GLOBAL INTEGRITY SCORECARD 75 (2008), available at http://www.globalintegrity.org/rep 
orts/2004 (last visited Apr. 5, 2010) (noting that efforts to reform the judicial system have had little 
effect in practice); TRANSPARENCY INT’L NICARAGUA REPORT, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL: THE 
GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST CORRUPTION 60 (2007), available at http://transparency.org (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2010) (concluding that the judicial branch is the “weakest point” in Nicaragua’s governmental 
institutions)). 
 
82
 Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1350. 
 
83
 45 F. Supp. 2d 276, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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[could] not be recognized under the Florida Recognition Act because it was 
rendered under a system which d[id] not provide impartial tribunals.”84 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Osorio court found  
that Defendants ha[d] established multiple, independent grounds under 
the Florida Recognition Act that compel[led] non-recognition of the 
$97 million Nicaraguan judgment.  Because the judgment was ‘ren-
dered under a system which d[id] not provide impartial tribunals or 
procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law,’ 
and the rendering court did not have jurisdiction over Defendants, the 
judgment [wa]s not considered conclusive, and c[ould] not be en-
forced under [section 55.605(1)(a)-(c) of] the Florida Recognition Act.  
Additionally, the judgment w[ould] not be enforced because ‘the cause 
of action or claim for relief on which the judgment [wa]s based [wa]s 
repugnant to the public policy of this state [pursuant to Florida Sta-
tutes section 55.605(2)(c) (2009)].’85 
Consequently, the district court ordered that Plaintiffs’ $97 million Nicara-
guan judgment would neither be “recognized nor enforced.”86 
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 Osorio, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1350 (quoting in part FLA. STAT. § 55.605(1)(a) (2009) (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
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 Id. at 1352. 
 
86
 Id. 
